#!/bin/bash
#
#   Copyright (c) 2013
#   Canonical, Ltd. (All rights reserved)
#
#   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
#   modify it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public
#   License published by the Free Software Foundation.
#
#   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
#   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
#   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
#   GNU General Public License for more details.
#
#   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
#   along with this program; if not, contact Canonical Ltd.
#

# Tests for post-parser equality among multiple profiles. These tests are
# useful to verify that keyword aliases, formatting differences, etc., all
# result in the same parser output.

set -o pipefail

_SCRIPTDIR=$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}" )

APPARMOR_PARSER="${APPARMOR_PARSER:-${_SCRIPTDIR}/../apparmor_parser}"
fails=0
errors=0
verbose="${VERBOSE:-}"

hash_binary_policy()
{
	printf %s "$1" | ${APPARMOR_PARSER} --features-file "${_SCRIPTDIR}/features_files/features.all" -qS 2>/dev/null| md5sum | cut -d ' ' -f 1
	return $?
}

# verify_binary - compares the binary policy of multiple profiles
# $1: Test type (equality or inequality)
# $2: A short description of the test
# $3: The known-good profile
# $4..$n: The profiles to compare against $3
#
# Upon failure/error, prints out the test description and profiles that failed
# and increments $fails or $errors for each failure and error, respectively
verify_binary()
{
	local t=$1
	local desc=$2
	local good_profile=$3
	local good_hash
	local ret=0

	shift
	shift
	shift

	if [ "$t" != "equality" ] && [ "$t" != "inequality" ]
	then
		printf "\nERROR: Unknown test mode:\n%s\n\n" "$t" 1>&2
		((errors++))
		return $((ret + 1))
	fi

	if [ -n "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
	if ! good_hash=$(hash_binary_policy "$good_profile")
	then
		if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
		printf "\nERROR: Error hashing the following \"known-good\" profile:\n%s\n\n" \
		       "$good_profile" 1>&2
		((errors++))
		return $((ret + 1))
	fi

	for profile in "$@"
	do
		if ! hash=$(hash_binary_policy "$profile")
		then
			if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
			printf "\nERROR: Error hashing the following profile:\n%s\n\n" \
			       "$profile" 1>&2
			((errors++))
			((ret++))
		elif [ "$t" == "equality" ] && [ "$hash" != "$good_hash" ]
		then
			if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
			printf "\nFAIL: Hash values do not match\n" 2>&1
			printf "known-good (%s) != profile-under-test (%s) for the following profile:\n%s\n\n" \
				"$good_hash" "$hash" "$profile" 1>&2
			((fails++))
			((ret++))
		elif [ "$t" == "inequality" ] && [ "$hash" == "$good_hash" ]
		then
			if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then printf "Binary %s %s" "$t" "$desc" ; fi
			printf "\nFAIL: Hash values match\n" 2>&1
			printf "known-good (%s) == profile-under-test (%s) for the following profile:\n%s\n\n" \
				"$good_hash" "$hash" "$profile" 1>&2
			((fails++))
			((ret++))
		fi
	done

	if [ $ret -eq 0 ]
	then
		if [ -z "$verbose" ] ; then
			printf "."
		else
			printf " ok\n"

		fi
	fi
	return $ret
}

verify_binary_equality()
{
	verify_binary "equality" "$@"
}

verify_binary_inequality()
{
	verify_binary "inequality" "$@"
}

printf "Equality Tests:\n"

verify_binary_equality "dbus send" \
	"/t { dbus send, }" \
	"/t { dbus write, }" \
	"/t { dbus w, }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus receive" \
	"/t { dbus receive, }" \
	"/t { dbus read, }" \
	"/t { dbus r, }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus send + receive" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive), }" \
	"/t { dbus (read, write), }" \
	"/t { dbus (r, w), }" \
	"/t { dbus (rw), }" \
	"/t { dbus rw, }" \

verify_binary_equality "dbus all accesses" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
	"/t { dbus (read, write, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
	"/t { dbus (r, w, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
	"/t { dbus (rw, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
	"/t { dbus (), }" \
	"/t { dbus, }" \

verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses with a bus conditional" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
	"/t { dbus (read, write, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
	"/t { dbus (r, w, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
	"/t { dbus (rw, bind, eavesdrop) bus=session, }" \
	"/t { dbus () bus=session, }" \
	"/t { dbus bus=session, }" \

verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses for services" \
	"/t { dbus bind name=com.foo, }" \
	"/t { dbus name=com.foo, }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses for messages" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo, }" \
	"/t { dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo, }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses for messages with peer names" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
	"/t { dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=(com.foo)), }" \
	"/t { dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(name=(com.foo)), }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus implied accesses for messages with peer labels" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(label=/usr/bin/app), }" \
	"/t { dbus path=/com/foo interface=org.foo peer=(label=/usr/bin/app), }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus element parsing" \
	"/t { dbus bus=b path=/ interface=i member=m peer=(name=n label=l), }" \
	"/t { dbus bus=\"b\" path=\"/\" interface=\"i\" member=\"m\" peer=(name=\"n\" label=\"l\"), }" \
	"/t { dbus bus=(b) path=(/) interface=(i) member=(m) peer=(name=(n) label=(l)), }" \
	"/t { dbus bus=(\"b\") path=(\"/\") interface=(\"i\") member=(\"m\") peer=(name=(\"n\") label=(\"l\")), }" \
	"/t { dbus bus =b path =/ interface =i member =m peer =(name =n label =l), }" \
	"/t { dbus bus= b path= / interface= i member= m peer= (name= n label= l), }" \
	"/t { dbus bus = b path = / interface = i member = m peer = ( name = n label = l ), }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus access parsing" \
	"/t { dbus, }" \
	"/t { dbus (), }" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), }" \
	"/t { dbus (send receive bind eavesdrop), }" \
	"/t { dbus (send,	receive                  bind,  eavesdrop), }" \
	"/t { dbus (send,receive,bind,eavesdrop), }" \
	"/t { dbus (send,receive,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,bind,eavesdrop), }" \
	"/t { dbus (send,send,send,send send receive,bind	eavesdrop), }" \

verify_binary_equality "dbus variable expansion" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo member=spork interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo label=/com/foo), }" \
	"@{FOO}=foo
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO} member=spork interface=org.@{FOO} peer=(name=com.@{FOO} label=/com/@{FOO}), }" \
	"@{FOO}=foo
	 @{SPORK}=spork
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO} member=@{SPORK} interface=org.@{FOO} peer=(name=com.@{FOO} label=/com/@{FOO}), }" \
	"@{FOO}=/com/foo
            /t { dbus (send, receive) path=@{FOO} member=spork interface=org.foo peer=(name=com.foo label=@{FOO}), }" \
	"@{FOO}=com
            /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/@{FOO}/foo member=spork interface=org.foo peer=(name=@{FOO}.foo label=/@{FOO}/foo), }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus variable expansion, multiple values/rules" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/{foo,bar}, }" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path={/com/foo,/com/bar}, }" \
	"@{FOO}=foo
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
	"@{FOO}=foo bar
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
	"@{FOO}=bar foo
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
	"@{FOO}={bar,foo}
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
	"@{FOO}=foo
	 @{BAR}=bar
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/{@{FOO},@{BAR}}, }" \

verify_binary_equality "dbus variable expansion, ensure rule de-duping occurs" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
	"@{FOO}=bar foo bar foo
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
	"@{FOO}=bar foo bar foo
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with all perms" \
	"/t { dbus, }" \
	"/t { dbus bus=session, dbus, }" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive, bind, eavesdrop), dbus, }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with bind" \
	"/t { dbus bind, }" \
	"/t { dbus bind bus=session, dbus bind, }" \
	"/t { dbus bind bus=system name=com.foo, dbus bind, }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with send and a bus conditional" \
	"/t { dbus send bus=system, }" \
	"/t { dbus send bus=system path=/com/foo interface=com.foo member=bar, dbus send bus=system, }" \
	"/t { dbus send bus=system peer=(label=/usr/bin/foo), dbus send bus=system, }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with an audit modifier" \
	"/t { audit dbus eavesdrop, }" \
	"/t { audit dbus eavesdrop bus=session, audit dbus eavesdrop, }"

verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization with a deny modifier" \
	"/t { deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo), }" \
	"/t { deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo label=/usr/bin/foo), deny dbus send bus=system peer=(name=com.foo), }" \

verify_binary_equality "dbus minimization found in dbus abstractions" \
	"/t { dbus send bus=session, }" \
	"/t { dbus send
                   bus=session
                   path=/org/freedesktop/DBus
                   interface=org.freedesktop.DBus
                   member={Hello,AddMatch,RemoveMatch,GetNameOwner,NameHasOwner,StartServiceByName}
                   peer=(name=org.freedesktop.DBus),
	      dbus send bus=session, }"

# verify slash filtering for dbus paths.
verify_binary_equality "dbus slash filtering for paths" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/foo, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com///foo, dbus (send, receive) path=///com/bar, }" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com//{foo,bar}, }" \
	"/t { dbus (send, receive) path={//com/foo,/com//bar}, }" \
	"@{FOO}=/foo
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, dbus (send, receive) path=/com/bar, }" \
	"@{FOO}=/foo /bar
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
	"@{FOO}=/bar //foo
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
	"@{FOO}=//{bar,foo}
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, }" \
	"@{FOO}=/foo
	 @{BAR}=bar
	    /t { dbus (send, receive) path=/com/@{FOO}, dbus (send, receive) path=/com//@{BAR}, }"

# Rules compatible with audit, deny, and audit deny
# note: change_profile does not support audit/allow/deny atm
for rule in "capability" "capability mac_admin" \
	"network" "network tcp" "network inet6 tcp"\
	"mount" "mount /a" "mount /a -> /b" "mount options in (ro) /a -> b" \
	"remount" "remount /a" \
	"umount" "umount /a" \
	"pivot_root" "pivot_root /a" "pivot_root oldroot=/" \
	 "pivot_root oldroot=/ /a" "pivot_root oldroot=/ /a -> foo" \
	"ptrace" "ptrace trace" "ptrace (readby,tracedby) peer=unconfined" \
	"signal" "signal (send,receive)" "signal peer=unconfined" \
	 "signal receive set=(kill)" \
	"dbus" "dbus send" "dbus bus=system" "dbus bind name=foo" \
	 "dbus peer=(label=foo)" "dbus eavesdrop" \
	"unix" "unix (create, listen, accept)" "unix addr=@*" "unix addr=none" \
	 "unix peer=(label=foo)" \
	"/f r" "/f w" "/f rwmlk" "/** r" "/**/ w" \
	"file /f r" "file /f w" "file /f rwmlk" \
	"link /a -> /b" "link subset /a -> /b" \
	"l /a -> /b" "l subset /a -> /b" \
	"file l /a -> /b" "l subset /a -> /b"
do
	verify_binary_equality "allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
		"/t { ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { allow ${rule}, }"

	verify_binary_equality "audit allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
		"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }"

	verify_binary_inequality "audit, deny, and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
		"/t { ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { deny ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { audit deny ${rule}, }"

	verify_binary_inequality "audit vs deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
		"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { deny ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { audit deny ${rule}, }"

	verify_binary_inequality "deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
		"/t { deny ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { audit deny ${rule}, }"
done

# Rules that need special treatment for the deny modifier
for rule in "/f ux" "/f Ux" "/f px" "/f Px" "/f cx" "/f Cx" "/f ix" \
            "/f pux" "/f Pux" "/f pix" "/f Pix" \
            "/f cux" "/f Cux" "/f cix" "/f Cix" \
            "/* ux" "/* Ux" "/* px" "/* Px" "/* cx" "/* Cx" "/* ix" \
            "/* pux" "/* Pux" "/* pix" "/* Pix" \
            "/* cux" "/* Cux" "/* cix" "/* Cix" \
	    "/f px -> b " "/f Px -> b" "/f cx -> b" "/f Cx -> b" \
            "/f pux -> b" "/f Pux -> b" "/f pix -> b" "/f Pix -> b" \
            "/f cux -> b" "/f Cux -> b" "/f cix -> b" "/f Cix -> b" \
            "/* px -> b" "/* Px -> b" "/* cx -> b" "/* Cx -> b" \
            "/* pux -> b" "/* Pux -> b" "/* pix -> b" "/* Pix -> b" \
            "/* cux -> b" "/* Cux -> b" "/* cix -> b" "/* Cix -> b" \
	    "file /f ux" "file /f Ux" "file /f px" "file /f Px" \
            "file /f cx" "file /f Cx" "file /f ix" \
            "file /f pux" "file /f Pux" "file /f pix" "file /f Pix" \
            "/f cux" "/f Cux" "/f cix" "/f Cix" \
            "file /* ux" "file /* Ux" "file /* px" "file /* Px" \
            "file /* cx" "file /* Cx" "file /* ix" \
            "file /* pux" "file /* Pux" "file /* pix" "file /* Pix" \
            "file /* cux" "file /* Cux" "file /* cix" "file /* Cix" \
	    "file /f px -> b " "file /f Px -> b" "file /f cx -> b" "file /f Cx -> b" \
            "file /f pux -> b" "file /f Pux -> b" "file /f pix -> b" "file /f Pix -> b" \
            "file /f cux -> b" "file /f Cux -> b" "file /f cix -> b" "file /f Cix -> b" \
            "file /* px -> b" "file /* Px -> b" "file /* cx -> b" "file /* Cx -> b" \
            "file /* pux -> b" "file /* Pux -> b" "file /* pix -> b" "file /* Pix -> b" \
            "file /* cux -> b" "file /* Cux -> b" "file /* cix -> b" "file /* Cix -> b"

do
	verify_binary_equality "allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
		"/t { ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { allow ${rule}, }"

	verify_binary_equality "audit allow modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
		"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }"

	# skip rules that don't end with x perm
	if [ -n "${rule##*x}" ] ; then continue ; fi

	verify_binary_inequality "deny, audit deny modifier for \"${rule}\"" \
		"/t { ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { audit allow ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { deny ${rule% *} x, }" \
		"/t { audit deny ${rule% *} x, }"

	verify_binary_inequality "audit vs deny and audit deny modifiers for \"${rule}\"" \
		"/t { audit ${rule}, }" \
		"/t { deny ${rule% *} x, }" \
		"/t { audit deny ${rule% *} x, }"

done

# verify deny and audit deny differ for x perms
for prefix in "/f" "/*" "file /f" "file /*" ; do
	verify_binary_inequality "deny and audit deny x modifiers for \"${prefix}\"" \
		"/t { deny ${prefix} x, }" \
		"/t { audit deny ${prefix} x, }"
done

#Test equality of leading and trailing file permissions
for audit in "" "audit" ; do
	for allow in "" "allow" "deny" ; do
		for owner in "" "owner" ; do
			for f in "" "file" ; do
				prefix="$audit $allow $owner $f"
				for perm in "r" "w" "a" "l" "k" "m" "rw" "ra" \
					    "rl" "rk" "rm" "wl" "wk" "wm" \
					    "rwl" "rwk" "rwm" "ral" "rak" \
					    "ram" "rlk" "rlm" "rkm" "wlk" \
					    "wlm" "wkm" "alk" "alm" "akm" \
					    "lkm" "rwlk" "rwlm" "rwkm" \
					    "ralk" "ralm" "wlkm" "alkm" \
					    "rwlkm" "ralkm" ; do
					verify_binary_equality "leading and trailing perms for \"${perm}\"" \
						"/t { ${prefix} /f ${perm}, }" \
						"/t { ${prefix} ${perm} /f, }"
				done
				if [ "$allow" == "deny" ] ; then continue ; fi
				for perm in "ux" "Ux" "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" \
					    "ix" "pux" "Pux" "pix" "Pix" \
					    "cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix"
				do
					verify_binary_equality "leading and trailing perms for \"${perm}\"" \
						"/t { ${prefix} /f ${perm}, }" \
						"/t { ${prefix} ${perm} /f, }"
				done
				for perm in "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" \
					    "pux" "Pux" "pix" "Pix" \
					    "cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix"
				do
					verify_binary_equality "leading and trailing perms for x-transition \"${perm}\"" \
						"/t { ${prefix} /f ${perm} -> b, }" \
						"/t { ${prefix} ${perm} /f -> b, }"
				done
			done
		done
	done
done

#Test rule overlap for x most specific match
for perm1 in "ux" "Ux" "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" "ix" "pux" "Pux" \
	     "pix" "Pix" "cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix" "px -> b" \
	     "Px -> b" "cx -> b" "Cx -> b" "pux -> b" "Pux ->b" \
	     "pix -> b" "Pix -> b" "cux -> b" "Cux -> b" \
	     "cix -> b" "Cix -> b"
do
	for perm2 in "ux" "Ux" "px" "Px" "cx" "Cx" "ix" "pux" "Pux" \
		     "pix" "Pix" "cux" "Cux" "cix" "Cix" "px -> b" \
	             "Px -> b" "cx -> b" "Cx -> b" "pux -> b" "Pux ->b" \
	             "pix -> b" "Pix -> b" "cux -> b" "Cux -> b" \
	             "cix -> b" "Cix -> b"
	do
		if [ "$perm1" == "$perm2" ] ; then
			verify_binary_equality "Exec perm \"${perm1}\" - most specific match: same as glob" \
				"/t { /* ${perm1}, /f ${perm2}, }" \
				"/t { /* ${perm1}, }"
		else
			verify_binary_inequality "Exec \"${perm1}\" vs \"${perm2}\" - most specific match: different from glob" \
				"/t { /* ${perm1}, /f ${perm2}, }" \
				"/t { /* ${perm1}, }"
		fi
	done
	verify_binary_inequality "Exec \"${perm1}\" vs deny x - most specific match: different from glob" \
		"/t { /* ${perm1}, audit deny /f x, }" \
		"/t { /* ${perm1}, }"

done

#Test deny carves out permission
verify_binary_inequality "Deny removes r perm" \
		       "/t { /foo/[abc] r, audit deny /foo/b r, }" \
		       "/t { /foo/[abc] r, }"

verify_binary_equality "Deny removes r perm" \
		       "/t { /foo/[abc] r, audit deny /foo/b r, }" \
		       "/t { /foo/[ac] r, }"

#this one may not be true in the future depending on if the compiled profile
#is explicitly including deny permissions for dynamic composition
verify_binary_equality "Deny of ungranted perm" \
		       "/t { /foo/[abc] r, audit deny /foo/b w, }" \
		       "/t { /foo/[abc] r, }"


verify_binary_equality "change_profile == change_profile -> **" \
		       "/t { change_profile, }" \
		       "/t { change_profile -> **, }"

verify_binary_equality "change_profile /** == change_profile /** -> **" \
		       "/t { change_profile /**, }" \
		       "/t { change_profile /** -> **, }"

verify_binary_equality "change_profile /** == change_profile /** -> **" \
		       "/t { change_profile unsafe /**, }" \
		       "/t { change_profile unsafe /** -> **, }"

verify_binary_equality "change_profile /** == change_profile /** -> **" \
		       "/t { change_profile /**, }" \
		       "/t { change_profile safe /** -> **, }"

verify_binary_inequality "change_profile /** == change_profile /** -> **" \
			 "/t { change_profile /**, }" \
			 "/t { change_profile unsafe /**, }"

verify_binary_equality "profile name is hname in rule" \
	":ns:/hname { signal peer=/hname, }" \
	":ns:/hname { signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"

verify_binary_inequality "profile name is NOT fq name in rule" \
	":ns:/hname { signal peer=:ns:/hname, }" \
	":ns:/hname { signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"

verify_binary_equality "profile name is hname in sub pofile rule" \
	":ns:/hname { profile child { signal peer=/hname//child, } }" \
	":ns:/hname { profile child { signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"

verify_binary_inequality "profile name is NOT fq name in sub profile rule" \
	":ns:/hname { profile child { signal peer=:ns:/hname//child, } }" \
	":ns:/hname { profile child { signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"

verify_binary_equality "profile name is hname in hat rule" \
	":ns:/hname { ^child { signal peer=/hname//child, } }" \
	":ns:/hname { ^child { signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"

verify_binary_inequality "profile name is NOT fq name in hat rule" \
	":ns:/hname { ^child { signal peer=:ns:/hname//child, } }" \
	":ns:/hname { ^child { signal peer=@{profile_name}, } }"

verify_binary_equality "@{profile_name} is literal in peer" \
	"/{a,b} { signal peer=/\{a,b\}, }" \
	"/{a,b} { signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"

verify_binary_equality "@{profile_name} is literal in peer with pattern" \
	"/{a,b} { signal peer={/\{a,b\},c}, }" \
	"/{a,b} { signal peer={@{profile_name},c}, }"

verify_binary_inequality "@{profile_name} is not pattern in peer" \
	"/{a,b} { signal peer=/{a,b}, }" \
	"/{a,b} { signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"

verify_binary_equality "@{profile_name} is literal in peer with esc sequence" \
	"/\\\\a { signal peer=/\\\\a, }" \
	"/\\\\a { signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"

verify_binary_equality "@{profile_name} is literal in peer with esc alt sequence" \
	"/\\{a,b\\},c { signal peer=/\\{a,b\\},c, }" \
	"/\\{a,b\\},c { signal peer=@{profile_name}, }"



# verify rlimit data conversions
verify_binary_equality "set rlimit rttime <= 12 weeks" \
                       "/t { set rlimit rttime <= 12 weeks, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7)) days, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24)) hours, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60)) minutes, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60)) seconds, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)) ms, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 * 1000)) us, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit rttime <= $((12 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000 * 1000)), }"

verify_binary_equality "set rlimit cpu <= 42 weeks" \
                       "/t { set rlimit cpu <= 42 weeks, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7)) days, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7 * 24)) hours, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7 * 24 * 60)) minutes, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60)) seconds, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit cpu <= $((42 * 7 * 24 * 60 * 60)), }"

verify_binary_equality "set rlimit memlock <= 2GB" \
                       "/t { set rlimit memlock <= 2GB, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit memlock <= $((2 * 1024)) MB, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit memlock <= $((2 * 1024 * 1024)) KB, }" \
                       "/t { set rlimit memlock <= $((2 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024)) , }"

# Unfortunately we can not just compare an empty profile and hat to a
# ie. "/t { ^test { /f r, }}"
# to the second profile with the equivalent rule inserted manually
# because policy write permission "w" actually expands to multiple permissions
# under the hood, and the parser is not adding those permissions
# to the rules it auto generates
# So we insert the rule with "append" permissions, and rely on the parser
# merging permissions of rules.
# If the parser isn't adding the rules "append" is not equivalent to
# the "write" permission in the second profile and the test will fail.
# If the parser is adding the change_hat proc attr rules then the
# rules should merge and be equivalent.
verify_binary_equality "change_hat rules automatically inserted"\
		       "/t { owner /proc/[0-9]*/attr/{apparmor/,}current a, ^test { owner /proc/[0-9]*/attr/{apparmor/,}current a, /f r, }}" \
		       "/t { owner /proc/[0-9]*/attr/{apparmor/,}current w, ^test { owner /proc/[0-9]*/attr/{apparmor/,}current w, /f r, }}"

# verify slash filtering for unix socket address paths.
# see https://bugs.launchpad.net/apparmor/+bug/1856738
verify_binary_equality "unix rules addr conditional" \
                       "/t { unix bind addr=@/a/bar, }" \
                       "/t { unix bind addr=@/a//bar, }" \
                       "/t { unix bind addr=@//a/bar, }" \
                       "/t { unix bind addr=@/a///bar, }" \
                       "@{HOME}=/a/
                           /t { unix bind addr=@@{HOME}/bar, }" \
                       "@{HOME}=/a/
                           /t { unix bind addr=@//@{HOME}bar, }" \
                       "@{HOME}=/a/
                           /t { unix bind addr=@/@{HOME}/bar, }"

verify_binary_equality "unix rules peer addr conditional" \
                       "/t { unix peer=(addr=@/a/bar), }" \
                       "/t { unix peer=(addr=@/a//bar), }" \
                       "/t { unix peer=(addr=@//a/bar), }" \
                       "/t { unix peer=(addr=@/a///bar), }" \
                       "@{HOME}=/a/
                           /t { unix peer=(addr=@@{HOME}/bar), }" \
                       "@{HOME}=/a/
                           /t { unix peer=(addr=@//@{HOME}bar), }" \
                       "@{HOME}=/a/
                           /t { unix peer=(addr=@/@{HOME}/bar), }"

# verify slash filtering for mount rules
verify_binary_equality "mount rules slash filtering" \
                       "/t { mount /dev/foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
                       "/t { mount ///dev/foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
                       "/t { mount /dev/foo -> /mnt//bar, }" \
                       "/t { mount /dev///foo -> ////mnt/bar, }" \
                       "@{MNT}=/mnt/
                           /t { mount /dev///foo -> @{MNT}/bar, }" \
                       "@{FOO}=/foo
                           /t { mount /dev//@{FOO} -> /mnt/bar, }"

# verify slash filtering for link rules
verify_binary_equality "link rules slash filtering" \
                       "/t { link /dev/foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
                       "/t { link ///dev/foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
                       "/t { link /dev/foo -> /mnt//bar, }" \
                       "/t { link /dev///foo -> ////mnt/bar, }" \
                       "@{BAR}=/mnt/
                           /t { link /dev///foo -> @{BAR}/bar, }" \
                       "@{FOO}=/dev/
                           /t { link @{FOO}//foo -> /mnt/bar, }" \
                       "@{FOO}=/dev/
                        @{BAR}=/mnt/
                           /t { link @{FOO}/foo -> @{BAR}/bar, }"

verify_binary_equality "attachment slash filtering" \
                       "/t /bin/foo { }" \
                       "/t /bin//foo { }" \
                       "@{BAR}=/bin/
			   /t @{BAR}/foo { }" \
                       "@{FOO}=/foo
			   /t /bin/@{FOO} { }" \
                       "@{BAR}=/bin/
                        @{FOO}=/foo
			   /t @{BAR}/@{FOO} { }"

# This can potentially fail as ideally it requires a better dfa comparison
# routine as it can generates hormomorphic dfas. The enumeration of the
# dfas dumped will be different, even if the binary is the same
# Note: this test in the future will require -O filter-deny and
# -O minimize and -O remove-unreachable.
verify_binary_equality "mount specific deny doesn't affect non-overlapping" \
			"/t { mount options=bind /e/ -> /**, }" \
			"/t { audit deny mount /s/** -> /**,
			      mount options=bind /e/ -> /**, }"

if [ $fails -ne 0 ] || [ $errors -ne 0 ]
then
	printf "ERRORS: %d\nFAILS: %d\n" $errors $fails 2>&1
	exit $((fails + errors))
fi

[ -z "${verbose}" ] && printf "\n"
printf "PASS\n"
exit 0
